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$54.95.

EQUALITY, REsPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW.

I.

PRELUDE: HISTORICAL

CONTEXT

If one were to ask an American lawyer or legal scholar for a
definition of liberalism, her explanation would likely include men
tion of constitutional provisions such as the First and Fourth
Amendments. This is because liberalism is today understood pri
marily as a theory of what government officials may not do to citi
zens. Its most immediate expression in law is thus taken to be those
parts of the Bill of Rights that set limits on state action.
This tendency to conceive of liberalism exclusively as a theory of
rights against government is a twentieth century phenomenon. To
be sure, liberalism has always embraced such rights. But for most
of its history, it has in addition contained a theory of rights against
private misconduct. It thus entailed not only a negative obligation
on the part of government to refrain from infringing upon the liber
ties of citizens, but also a positive obligation to provide criminal and
civil law that protects against, and provides redress for, wrongful
invasions of rights by private actors. Thus, whereas today liber
alism is primarily understood as a theory of constitutional rights, for
most of its history it was offered as a theory of both rights and
wrongs.
The older conception of liberalism is evident in the work of
Blackstone. Blackstone quite explicitly organized the Commenta
ries so that they would "in the first place consider the rights that are
commanded, and secondly the wrongs that are forbidden by the
laws of England."1 Implicit in this organization is the claim that,
just as English liberalism entailed a duty on the part of government
to respect individuals' rights, so too it entailed an obligation to en* Associate Professor, Vanderbilt University Law School. B.A. 1983, Wesleyan; M.Phil.
(Politics) 1985, Oxford; M.A. (Politics) 1988, Princeton; J.D. 1991, New York University. Ed. Thanks to William J. Booth, Lisa Bressman, Rebecca Brown, Julie Faber, Steve Hetcher,
Nancy King, David Partlett, Stephen Perry, Bob Rasmussen, Tony Sebok, Nick Zeppos, and
Ben Zipursky for helpful comments. Thanks also to Vanderbilt University Law School for
generous financial support.
1. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES ON nm LAWS OF ENGLAND 118 (facsimile
ed. 1979) (1765-69).
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act and administer laws against private misconduct. These wrongs
include what Blackstone called "private" or "civil" wrongs wrongs against particular persons - and "public" or "criminal"
wrongs - wrongs against society as a whole.2 Critically, for
Blackstone, the law of wrongs incorporated both a prospective and
a remedial component. Government was "officially bound" not
only to specify the conduct forbidden by law, but to provide "re
dress" for harms caused by such conduct.3

In American legal scholarship, Holmes's writings mark both the
apogee and the beginning of the demise of the Blackstonian synthe
sis. Holmes, of course, abandoned Blackstone's vocabulary of
rights and wrongs in favor of what he took to be the more rigorous
Benthamite language of liberties and harms. But The Common
Law otherwise tracks the Commentaries in claiming to find the
organizing principle of Anglo-American private law in its consistent
enforcement of what Blackstone called the principle of "civil lib
erty": the principle that one is at liberty to act, so long as one acts
with due regard for the liberty of others.4 For Holmes, the common
law, as much as the Constitution, embodied the spirit of liberalism.
By imposing liability for unreasonable conduct, it succeeded in rec
onciling the liberty and security of each.5
By the time Holmes had ascended to the Supreme Court, liber
alism had come to be identified with a rigidly laissez faire theory of
government (expressed in public law as economic due process), and
a brutally atomistic account of civil society (expressed in such tort
doctrines as the privity rule, the fellow servant rule, and assumption
of risk).6 Progressive legal scholars, ironically invoking the positiv
ist and skeptical aspects of Holmes's work, sought to develop prag
matic and utilitarian theories of government and civil society that,
by abolishing the basic liberal categories of rights and wrongs,
would sanction political and legal reform. The major thrust of this
effort in constitutional scholarship was, of course, to challenge the
courts' deployment of rights to strike down social and economic
legislation.7 Meanwhile, scholars of the common law argued that it
was a mistake to conceive of crime and tort as concerned with
wrongs. The latter, in particular, had to be understood not as
Blackstone's law of "private" wrongs, but as "public law in dis2. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 2.
3. See id. at 115.
4. See 1 id. at 121 (defining civil liberty); OLIVER WENDELL HoLMES, JR., THE CoMMoN
LAW 144 (Boston, Little, Brown, and Company 1881).
5. See HOLMES, supra note 4, at 144.
6. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U.
PA. L. REv. 1733, 1761, 1784 (1998) (noting scholars' linkage of these legal doctrines with
laissez faire liberalism).
7. See id. at 1777-89.

1830

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 97:1828

guise."8 The law of battery, negligence, nuisance, and defamation
could then be seen for what it "really" was: a specialized language
that lawyers and judges used to make policy decisions as to what
level of "protection [against harm] . . . should be extended the liti
gants which at the same time best serves the interests of the rest of
us."9
The assault on liberalism in law was for a variety of reasons
enormously successful. By the late 1930s, the Supreme Court had
abandoned economic due process, and the Realist account of tort
found in the work of Leon Green and William Prosser was in the
ascendancy. Yet, in the wake of World War II and the civil rights
movement, liberalism reemerged as a theory of how government
actors ought to treat citizens.10 Particularly in the 1970s and 1980s,
political theorists such as Rawls and Dworkin developed elaborate
accounts of the rights that officials are obliged to respect, and they
and others developed correspondingly rich theories of constitu
tional law.11 As I noted at the outset, however, the liberal revival
has for the most part been one-sided. Most neoliberals have plenty
to say about rights, but little to say about wrongs.12 In particular,
they seem quite content to adhere to the Realist notion that tort
law is public law.13
That the new rights theory has not been accompanied by a new
theory of wrongs is largely attributable to the fact that the liber
alism of the 1970s tended to take on a strongly egalitarian cast.
Dworkin, for example, argued that liberalism itself is founded on a
principle of equal concern and respect.14 More significantly, he and
other neoliberals maintain that the same notion of equality that en
tails that government must respect the rights of citizens also entails
that it must take steps to ameliorate the effects of economic ine
quality on each individual's capacity to exercise those rights. This
commitment to egalitarianism has made it hard for liberals to warm
up to tort and criminal law, which, on their face, seem indifferent, if
not hostile, to equality. Tort law, in particular, strikes many as ine
galitarian in principle, since it is prepared to redistribute wealth
8. Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise (Part II), 38 TEXAS L. REv. 257, 257
(1960).
9. Id. at 265.
10. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 6, at 1790-1807.
11. See, e.g., RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); JoHN RAwLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
12. One obvious and important exception is George Fletcher. See, e.g., George P.
Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv. 537 {1972). Of course liber
tarians, including most prominently Richard Epstein, continued to maintain that there is a
strong connection between the liberal account of rights and its account of wrongs. See Rich
ard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 203-04 (1973).
13. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 6, at 1738-39, 1767-72.
14. See DwoRKIN, supra note 11, at 177-83.
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from even a poor defendant to a rich plaintiff if the legal conditions
for imposing liability are met.1 5 Thus, it is not surprising to find
egalitarian liberals, like their utilitarian predecessors from earlier in
the century, favoring judicial decisions and legislative reforms that
move tort doctrine closer to a redistribution scheme (or eliminate it
altogether). 1 6
II.

A THEORY OF WRONGS FOR THE NEW LIBERALISM

Against the preceding backdrop, Equality, Responsibility, and
the Law, by Professor Arthur Ripstein of the University of Toronto,

can be understood as a sustained effort to convince present-day,
egalitarian liberals that Anglo-American tort and criminal law are
neither indifferent nor hostile to, but actually expressions of, a the
ory of rights. In short, it seeks to revive and recast the dormant
Blackstonian tradition that conceives of liberalism as a unified the
ory of rights and wrongs. With Blackstone, Ripstein argues that the
same liberal principle of equality that dictates how officials must act
toward citizens also sets the substantive terms on which private
individuals must interact. With Holmes, Ripstein claims that the
law's commitment to this principle is most clearly evidenced by the
centrality of the concept of reasonableness to criminal and tort law.
With Rawls and Dworkin, Ripstein maintains that liberalism entails
both an equal distribution of basic liberties and a fair distribution of
wealth.
Ripstein finds liberalism's unity in a bedrock principle of reci
procity. The reciprocity principle holds that the state is justified in
coercing citizens only insofar as it upholds "[f]air terms of interac
tion" between them (p. 6). More specifically, it requires the state to
treat each person equally by ensuring that each has resources that
enable her to exercise her right to liberty and by establishing laws
that "protect people equally from each other" (p. 6). To conform to
the reciprocity principle, law must therefore include among its goals
the protection against government interference with basic liberties,
as well as the provision to each of certain primary goods, "so that
the results of voluntary interaction reflect choices rather than arbi
trary starting points" (p. 2). But law must also ensure reciprocity in
private interaction by establishing, through the use of reasonable
ness standards, the proper balance between each actor's claim to
liberty of action and each other actor's interest in the security of his
person and property (p. 6). In addition, law must enforce those
15. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, R.IsKS AND WRONGS 304 (1992).
16. See, e.g., RONALD DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 240-63 (1986) (apparently endorsing rec
ognition in British law of a general cause of action for negligent infliction of foreseeable
emotional distress); Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29 Aruz. ST. L.J. 353, 353, 355-56
(1997) (apparently defending judicial implementation of market-share liability).
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boundaries by, respectively, punishing those who consciously
choose to act unreasonably, and by requiring those who act unrea
sonably (whether consciously or not) to compensate for injuries
they cause.
Ripstein's book builds on the seminal works of Jules Coleman,17
George Fletcher,18 and Ernest Weinrib,19 among others. His effort
to find in the principle of reciprocity a unified theory of corrective,
criminal, and distributive justice is nonetheless original. It is also
among the most sophisticated applications to date of Rawlsian
political theory to law. As such, it deserves (and requires) a careful
read from anyone interested in theories of tort and crime, theories
of liberalism and equality, and theories of law itself. I will provide
an analytical summary of Ripstein's arguments in what follows. But
the reader must tum to the book itself to appreciate the breadth of
its ambition and the depth of its insights.
Before proceeding further, it will be helpful to note two central
and recurrent features of the book's analysis, both of which are ad
verted to in its claim to offer a "political" theory of law and justice
(p. 12). When Ripstein describes his theory as political, he is in the
first place invoking Rawls's use of that term to describe an anti
metaphysical, antifoundational approach to justification.20 In
describing and defending the reciprocity principle, Ripstein dis
avows reliance on metaphysical arguments about the self, as well as
appeals to self-evident or otherwise uncontentious premises. Con
versely, he criticizes scholars such as Weinrib for attempting to
ground theories of law in accounts of human agency. In place of
such arguments, Equality, Responsibility, and the Law offers an ac
count that deliberately straddles the line between description and
prescription. In particular, it seeks to demonstrate how doctrines
and concepts drawn from tort and criminal law both instantiate the
principle of reciprocity and demonstrate its normative
attractiveness.
Ripstein's account is also political in a second sense employed
by Rawls: it aims to provide accounts of distributive justice, crimi
nal punishment, and tort compensation that do not derive from the
ories of individual moral responsibility. The principle of reciprocity
is, in his words, a principle of political morality: it addresses the
question of when and why the state can claim legitimate authority
to coerce, as opposed to when and why one can be deemed to have
17. See COLEMAN, supra note 15, at 197-385 (developing a corrective justice account of
tort law).
18. See Fletcher, supra note 12.
19. See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 145-203 (1995) (developing a
corrective justice account of tort law).
20. See JoHN RAWLS, PoLmCAL LIBERALISM 10-15 (1993).
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acted in a culpable or blameworthy fashion (p. 12). As a principle
of political morality, reciprocity provides an anti-utilitarian theory
of the benefits and protections that the law must, as a matter of
fairness, afford to each citizen. As a principle of political morality,
reciprocity maintains that the benefits and sanctions imposed by
criminal and tort law are grounded not in notions of individual cul
pability but in the distinctively political norm of equality.21 Thus,
Ripstein's attempt to reconnect a liberal theory of rights with a lib
eral theory of wrongs is bound up with an effort to steer a path
between utilitarian and efficiency theories of law on the one hand,
and moral theories on the other.
A.

Torts: Corrective Justice, Risk Ownership,
and Reasonableness
1. Responsibility and Risk Ownership

According to Ripstein, Anglo-American tort law embodies a
principle of corrective justice, which is in turn a corollary to the
fundamental principle of reciprocity. As he renders it, the principle
of corrective justice specifies when the state may fairly force the
transfer of one person's loss to another by means of compensatory
payment.
Ripstein commences his account of corrective justice in Chapter
Two by briefly entertaining and dispensing with two alternative ren
ditions of that idea: the "voluntarist" and "causalist" accounts (pp.
16-17, 30-35). The former holds that the state may require an actor
to pay for losses suffered by others only if the actor intended to
cause those losses. The latter, familiar from the early work of
Richard Epstein, asserts that an actor may be compelled to take on
any loss that she causes. Ripstein appropriately criticizes the volun
tarist account as creating an implausibly narrow field of responsibil
ity. He then criticizes the causalist account on the now-familiar
ground that it is caught on the horns of a dilemma: brute physical
causation is a two-way street incapable of assigning responsibility
for losses between an injurer and a victim, but more determinate
notions of causation only solve this problem by introducing norma
tive considerations foreign to the concept of causation itself.22
Ripstein revisits this ground because he is less interested in es
tablishing that these accounts fail than in drawing lessons from why
they fail. Indeed, he regards their failures as quadruply instructive.
21. Ripstein does not deny, of course, that tort and criminal law deter, nor that many
tortfeasors and criminals commit morally culpable acts. His point is that law typically does
not, and cannot, rely on reasons of deterrence or moral culpability to justify its rules and
sanctions.
22. See Stephen R. Perry, The Impossibility of General Strict Liability, 1 CANADIAN J.L.
& JURISPRUDENCE 147, 169 {1988).
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First, he maintains that, for all their flaws, both accounts rightly
perceive that an adequate theory of corrective justice for a liberal
society must provide a principled account of the line between mis
fortune, the effects of which lie where they fall (or with the commu
nity as a whole), and wrongful loss, for which the law ought to
permit the victim to demand compensation from the wrongdoer(s).
Cast in Ripstein's preferred vocabulary, both accounts perceive that
a theory of corrective justice will tum on the adequacy of its ac
count of "risk ownership": the circumstances under which an agent
whose conduct poses the risk of harm to others can be said to own
that risk, and can thus legitimately be forced to bear the costs that
are incurred when that risk is realized (pp. 46-47).
Second, Ripstein argues that one common failing of both the
voluntarist and causalist accounts lies in their desire to develop a
nonnormative account of risk ownership. Seeking to avoid contro
versial judgments, the voluntarist looks to the fact of the actor's
intent to settle the boundaries of risk ownership. Causalists like
wise look to the fact of causation. That both fail in their quest for a
descriptive theory of corrective justice indicates that a satisfactory
account cannot refrain from incorporating normative judgments (p.

18).
Third, Ripstein infers from the counterintuitiveness of the vol
untarist account that a better account of risk ownership may reside
in its theoretical mirror image. The voluntarist account, he argues,
is facially unattractive because it calls for a legal regime in which
each person is permitted unilaterally to determine the risks that she
owns by reference to what she intends (p. 31). By implication, it
suggests that a more attractive theory of risk ownership will center
on the opposing idea of reciprocity.
Finally, the causalist account, for all its defects, establishes the
propriety of an account of corrective justice that links reciprocity to
causation. The error of the causalist account is to treat causation as
necessary and sufficient for responsibility to repair. The truth
within this error is that causation is necessary, just not sufficient.
As Ripstein explains, "causation links actions to their effects; and
the effects of actions are the only candidates for corrective justice to
undo" (p. 35).

2. Reasonableness as Reciprocity
Having drawn these lessons from the critique of voluntarism
and causalism, Ripstein proceeds in Chapters Three and Four to
construct his own account of corrective justice and risk ownership.
The basic features of such an account, he maintains, are already at
hand in the common law of torts, particularly in the law of negli
gence and its core idea of the reasonable person. Indeed, reasona-
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bleness, he maintains, is simply an instantiation in law of the
principle of reciprocity (pp. 94-95).
What does the law mean when it states that individuals who act
unreasonably can be forced to compensate for harm caused by that
conduct? According to Ripstein, it means that, as a matter of jus
tice, individuals are held to own the consequences of risks that they
illegitimately impose on others (whether intentionally or uninten
tionally) when those risks are realized. When does one illegiti
mately impose risks on others? When one acts in pursuit of
interests of one's own that are less important than the interest of
others in security against harm to person and property. In short, we
own risks, and the losses fl.owing from those risks, when, by our
conduct, we take liberties with the important interests of others (p.

49).
Once reasonableness is understood as an expression of the prin
ciple of reciprocity, Ripstein argues, we gain insight into the mean
ing of negligence law's reasonable person standard. In particular,
he argues (in a manner similar to Greg Keating) that this under
standing permits lawyers and academics to reclaim the reasonable
person from the economists.23 Judgments about reasonableness do
entail balancing certain considerations, but the balance to be struck
is not measured in terms of costs and benefits. Indeed, Ripstein
maintains that neither the cost of precaution nor expected loss is
strictly relevant to the fault determination (pp. 58-60). Rather,
courts weigh (or ought to weigh) the importance of the defendant's
liberty interest against the plaintiff's security interest. Critically,
this determination does not involve measuring the subjective values
that the plaintiff and defendant actually assign to these interests.
Nor does it entail a Fletcher-like assessment of whether the defend
ant's conduct creates an amount of risk that exceeds the back
ground amount of risk associated with ordinary activity.24 Rather,
it requires a normative assessment of the plaintiff's interest in acting
and the defendant's interest in being free of injury that is "based on
a conception of their importance to leading an autonomous life."25
And so, to take a simple example, when a court or jury holds a
driver at "fault" for speeding in an effort to avoid being late to an
ordinary business meeting, it does not weigh the diminished utility
of the driver against the expected harm his speeding will cause, nor
whether the activity exposes others to a risk greater than those to
23. Pp. 58-60; see also Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence
Theory, 48 STAN. L. REv. 311, 312-13 (1996) (arguing that the negligence standard employs a
Rawlsian notion of reasonableness rather than cost/benefit analysis).
24. See Fletcher, supra note 12, at 548 (arguing that the negligence rule governs activities
that create roughly reciprocal amounts of risk).
25. P. 55. In Ripstein's parlance, "the reasonable person thinks from the perspective of
equality, and takes such care as is required by a like liberty and security for all." P. 63.
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which others expose the driver. Rather it asserts that the risk of
physical injury to other drivers and pedestrians outweighs the de
fendant's interest in arriving on time at an ordinary meeting.
Ripstein further claims that his explication of reasonableness in
terms of reciprocity explains and justifies courts' adherence to an
objective standard of reasonableness. Use of such a standard, he
suggests, is "the only way to treat the parties as equals, by protect
ing them each from the activities of others, and leaving them each
with room to pursue his or her own purposes" (p. 85). As a matter
of reciprocity, the law must treat each actor as capable of complying
with the objective standard. It is similarly obliged to afford the
same (nominal) level of protection against injury to each potential
victim.

In similar fashion, Ripstein runs through many of the basic con
cepts and principles of common law negligence - the duty require
ment, the risk rule, the rule of strict liability for ultrahazardous
activities, the thin-skull rule, and the misfeasance/nonfeasance dis
tinction - suggesting in each case that the idea of reciprocity is
instantiated in, and thus illuminates, the relevant concept or princi
ple (pp. 64-92). In the most extended discussion of this sort, he
suggests that the idea of reciprocity provides a satisfactory explana
tion of the "damage" requirement of negligence law, and thus a
rejoinder to the "moral luck" critics of tort law, including
Christopher Schroeder and Jeremy Waldron.26
According to these critics, tort law cannot be defended as imple
menting a moral theory of responsibility because it imposes dispa
rate sanctions on equally culpable defendants based on the purely
contingent fact of how much damage their conduct happens to
cause.27 A compensation system can only satisfy morality, they
maintain, if it (a) imposes liability for risk creation in its own right,
and/or (b) abandons the "make-whole" measure of damages in
favor of a measure that renders damages proportional to the de
fendant's culpability.
The moral luck critique goes wrong, Ripstein argues, by suppos
ing that tort liability turns on the culpability of the defendant.28
26. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Causation, Compensation and Moral Responsibility, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ToRT LAW 347, 360-61 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); Jeremy
Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
TORT LAw, supra, at 387, 398-401.
27. See, e.g., Schroeder, supra note 26, at 360-61.
28. P. 73. In addition, Ripstein notes that many cases which seem to recognize the force
of the moral luck critique by eliminating the causation/damage requirement - for example
decisions imposing market share liability or liability for increased risk of disease - in fact do
not. Most market share cases, for example, do not eliminate the causation requirement; they
simply shift the burden of proof. Pp. 77-80. Likewise, risk-of-disease cases require a showing
of emotional distress or economic loss. Pp. 75-76. Ripstein also points out that the moral
luck theorists' own proposed solutions to the problem they identify - such as the creation of
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The question of responsibility for losses, he insists, is not the moral
issue of culpability or blame. Rather, it is the political question of
risk ownership: how to allocate fairly the losses that attend acci
dental harm. Because the negligence standard sets fair terms of in
teraction, a negligent defendant who causes damage has no grounds
in fairness to complain if he is held liable. Nor does the fact that
other negligent defendants fortuitously face lesser damages, or es
cape liability altogether, render the exaction of compensation from
him unfair. "[T]hose who have a fair chance to avoid liability are
not treated arbitrarily if they are held liable even if they might have
had better luck."29
Ripstein's response to the moral luck critics leads into the argu
ment of Chapter Four, which picks up and amplifies the argument
that the normative core of negligence law lies in the principle of
reciprocity. In this instance, the doctrinal vehicles for this argument
are the concepts of foreseeability and proximate cause, and the the
orist who provides Ripstein's foil is Stephen Perry.
Perry, like Ripstein, conceives of the task of corrective justice
theory as specifying when the law may legitimately shift losses that
befall one citizen to another.30 Unlike Ripstein, however, Perry
maintains that the key to defining this set resides in a theory of
moral responsibility. This idea, Perry argues, is already present in
negligence law's employment of the concept of foreseeability as a
necessary condition for liability. The law sets that condition, he ar
gues, because it would violate a fundamental moral principle to re
quire actors to repair losses that they lacked the ability to predict
and avoid.
According to Ripstein, Perry is wrong to treat the concept of
foresight as a reflection of morality in law. If it were such a con
cept, he maintains, the law would use a subjective rather than an
objective standard of foresight.31 That the law requires only rea
sonable foreseeability instead indicates that it is concerned with satrisk pools - are themselves morally arbitrary: they single out only certain wrongdoers (and
not necessarily the worst ones) to contribute to the pool, and they grant compensation only
to those injured by wrongdoers as opposed to all (innocent) sufferers of injury. Pp. 80-84.
29. P. 84. Ripstein's response strikes me as only partially successful. Imagine a driver
who faces massive liability because she took her eyes off the road for an instant. The most
convincing explanation of why she can be held in any way responsible for the ensuing harm
may be that she violated a standard of conduct that sets fair terms of interaction. Still, it is
hard to see why it is fair to force her to pay compensation out of all proportion to the minor
nature of her violation. If, in the criminal context, fairness operates as a constraint on pun
ishment, why should it not also constrain civil liability?
30. See Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 lowA L. REv. 449, 506-

507 (1992).
31. As Ripstein explains: "[I]f I didn't even consider the possibility [of harming the

plaintiff] , it is hard to see why whether it is related to my agency should turn on whether
others exercising ordinary capacities for foresight would have foreseen it." P. 102 (emphasis
in original).
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isfying considerations of fairness. Reasonable foresight is
demanded by reciprocity in part because, in its absence, tort law
would violate Fullerian 'procedural natural law' by failing to supply
actors with public notice of the legal consequences of their conduct
(p. 105). More fundamentally, the imposition of liability for unfore
seeable harms would violate reciprocity for the reason Holmes ar
ticulated more than a century ago: it would be too burdensome on
liberty (p. 105).
According to Ripstein, once we perceive that foreseeability
itself derives from the principle of reciprocity, we can make sense of
cases in which the acts of other agents intervene between the de
fendant's negligent act and the plaintiff's injury, including Scott v.
Shepherd,32 and Wagner v. International Railway Co.33 The modern
rule for cases like these is that the original tortfeasor will be held
liable unless the intervening act of the third party was unforesee
able. However, on Ripstein's account, the determination of what
counts as foreseeable itself turns on reasonableness. Thus, what
these cases really stand for is the proposition that a third party's
intervening act - the passing of the bomb in Scott, the attempted
rescue in Wagner
are deemed foreseeable only because the inter
vening act was itself reasonable (i.e., a legitimate exercise of the in
tervening actor's liberty) (pp. 116-26). The intervening cause cases
thus reveal themselves to be yet another expression in tort law of
the political principle of reciprocity.34
-

B.

Penal Justice: Punishment, Conscious Wrongs, and
Risk Ownership

In Chapters Five through Seven, Ripstein turns the lens of reci
procity from tort to criminal law. The mission and methodology are
the same: to steer clear of metaphysical, utilitarian, and moral the
ories of crime so as to understand criminal law as flowing from the
political principle of reciprocity. In one important respect, how
ever, the content of the analysis is quite different. Indeed, Ripstein
maintains that, although the substantive provisions of criminal and
tort law are alike in their concern to set fair terms of interaction,
32. 95 Eng. Rep. 1124 (K.B. 1773).
33. 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921).
34. The discussion of foreseeability and proximate cause is among the most difficult sec·
tions of the book, in part because Ripstein seems at times to run together the question of the
original tortfeasor's responsibility to the victim and that of the intervening actor's responsi
bility to the victim. He also may give conflicting accounts of the intervening actor's liability.
Compare p. 114 (arguing that where an intervening agent acts reasonably in response to the
original tortfeasor's wrongdoing so as to cause injury to the plaintiff, the reasonableness of
the intervening act is "a bar to liability"), with p. 117 (arguing that where X wrongly throws a
bomb in the direction of Y, and Y reasonably acts to preserve his life by tossing the bomb
toward Z, thereby injuring Z, Y is liable to Z).
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the former contains a dimension absent from the latter because it is
concerned with a particular kind of antireciprocal conduct.

1.

Crime and Punishment: Vindicating Reciprocity

For Ripstein, the key to unlocking the distinction between tort
and criminal law resides in the different remedies they provide,
namely compensation and punishment. This distinction, he main
tains, is not captured by the utilitarian idea that crimes are an espe
cially harmful form of conduct that warrant special deterrent
measures (pp. 142-43). Nor is it correct to maintain that crimes are
met with punishment in order to express a moral judgment that the
criminal has behaved in an especially culpable or blameworthy
fashion (pp. 144-47). Instead, Ripstein argues that state-imposed
punishment is best understood as vindicating the principle of reci
procity by sanctioning and deterring a certain subset of acts that
constitute direct assaults on that principle.
Ripstein isolates the special characteristic of criminal conduct by
contrasting it with unintentionally tortious conduct. Unintentional
tortfeasors, he says, merely "take" illegitimate risks (p. 134). If
those risks are realized, the state may fairly force them to pay for
the losses that others incur when those risks are realized. Criminals
not only take unfair risks, they "choose" them (p. 134). Thus,
whereas torts involve conduct that is injurious to individual's rights,
crimes typically "add insult to injury," because the criminal by his
acts shows contempt for the very idea that he must conduct himself
with due regard for the basic interests of others.35
·

For Ripstein, then, the essence of crime lies in the criminal's
calculated decision to impose unilaterally the terms of interaction
on others. The criminal is one who knows that his conduct will pose
illegitimate risks to others, but takes those risks nonetheless, be
cause he believes that, even if he is forced to pay for the damage he
causes, he will still experience a gain in welfare.36 Punishment,
whether in the form of fines or imprisonment,37 is a necessary re
sponse to crime because only punishment is capable of sending the
message that one cannot treat others' rights as mere costs. Punish
ment thus serves to "denounce such behavior as unreasonable and
. . . ensure that it is irrational [from the perspective of the defend
ant], by shifting the cost-benefit analysis so that the apparent ad
vantage disappears" (p. 153). Because it serves to "vindicate the
35. P. 148. Certain crimes, such as attempts, insult without injuring.
36. Thus, on Ripstein's account, intentional torts are criminal acts. See infra text accom
panying notes 58-59.
37. According to Ripstein, punishment for crimes mala prohibita often takes the form of
monetary penalties because these crimes do not entail violations of the fundamental auton
omy rights of others. By contrast, precisely because they entail rights violations, crimes ma/a
in se require more severe punishment, including imprisonment. Pp. 156-57.
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system of rights as a whole and to vindicate the particular victim's
rights," it is essential to the maintenance of interaction on terms of
equality.38

2. Reasonableness and Risk Ownership in Criminal Law
On Ripstein's view, criminal law is tied up with fairness because,
as just indicated, criminal punishment is necessary to vindicate the
principle of reciprocity. But criminal law is more than just meta
law, for it, too, sets rules of primary conduct. More specifically,
criminal law, like tort law, employs the concept of reasonableness
to allocate fairly risk ownership. Thus, Ripstein argues that the rec
iprocity principle is evident in, and makes sense of, certain doc
trines that have proved puzzling to other theories of criminal law,
particularly those that view crime in terms of moral responsibility.
In support of this argument, Ripstein focuses on four doctrinal
areas in criminal law: self-defense, consent, attempts, and reckless
ness. 39 Ripstein treats the first two under the general heading of
mistakes. A defendant, he notes, is generally held to be justified in
committing an otherwise criminal act if his action was based on a
reasonable mistake of fact. Thus, an actor commits no crime if he
intentionally injures another out of the mistaken but reasonable be
lief that he must do so to avoid imminent death or bodily harm. A
defendant is likewise justified with respect to certain criminal
offenses (e.g., battery, rape) if he reasonably but mistakenly be
lieves that the victim has consented to physical contact.
According to Ripstein, the fact that reasonable mistakes of this
sort are exculpatory poses problems for "subjectivist" theories that
focus on the moral culpability of the defendant. If immorality is the
essence of criminality, he argues, the test for mistakes ought to be
subjective, for criminals who are genuinely mistaken about the cir
cumstances in which they act are not morally blameworthy (p. 176).
Likewise, the subjectivist also has a hard time explaining why the
law does not regard genuine mistakes of law as exculpatory, since
here too the criminal believes he is doing no wrong.40
The lesson to be drawn from these difficulties is the same lesson
drawn from the deficiencies Ripstein found in moral accounts of
tort liability, namely that the law's concepts are properly under38. P. 148. In Calabresian terms, Ripstein argues that criminal punishment is necessary
to ensure that the law protects individuals' rights through a scheme of property rules rather
than liability mies.
39. I merely note Ripstein's treatment of recklessness. See infra note 44.
40. Pp. 179-80. As Ripstein explains, some subjectivists attempt to resolve the latter
problem by resort to Kantian metaphysics. Mistakes of law do not exculpate, they argue,
because "anyone who acts cannot but realize that certain acts are wrongful." P. 184. In an
elegant piece of philosophizing, Ripstein demonstrates that this sort of metaphysical argu
ment only works to the extent it relies on normative principles not entailed by metaphysics.
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stood as political, not moral. When courts exculpate a defendant
on the ground of reasonable mistakes, they are in fact asserting that
it would treat the defendant unequally to allocate the risk of mis
take on her. In short, cases of self-defense and consent, like negli
gence cases, are really about allocating risk ownership on terms
consistent with the principle of reciprocity (p. 201). Here, however,
the risk is not of injury, but of error as to the meaning of others'
conduct. The reasonableness test in self-defense cases allocates this
risk of misinterpretation by demanding that the defendant make
some effort to determine if he is justified in perceiving an imminent
threat, but not so much effort as to unduly burden his liberty or
threaten his life. Likewise, the reasonableness test for consent sets
fair terms of interaction, since all persons share an interest in being
able to engage in genuinely cooperative activity. In short, the treat
ment of mistakes in criminal law upholds reciprocity by permitting
each to "act on appearances."41
Ripstein maintains that reciprocity also permits a better account
of the fact that the common law of crime, unlike tort law, concerned
itself with attempts, yet traditionally regarded them as less serious
than completed crimes. The law, he explains, punishes attempts not
because they are bad acts, but because they, like completed crimes,
are acts that "manifest" the criminal's substitution of calculating,
private rationality for public reasonableness. Attempts are thus in
some sense misnamed, for they are in fact fully completed crimes.
They form a distinct class only because they fail to achieve some
further objective. Because the actor who attempts a crime publicly
displays her disregard for the rights of others through her conduct,
she is eligible for punishment, even though she has not succeeded in
her ultimate goal of invading the rights of others.42
Reciprocity, Ripstein argues, also permits us to make sense of
the law's distinction between genuine attempts and mere prepara
tion. That distinction, Ripstein argues, does not tum on the factual
issue of how close the criminal came to completing the crime in
question. Rather, it involves the political question of when a de
fendant may fairly be subjected to punishment. According to Rip
stein, fairness requires that an actor's conduct not be punishable as
an attempt unless a reasonable person who observed his conduct
without knowledge of his mental state would conclude that a crime
is being attempted. For, just as it would illegitimately burden an
actor's liberty to deny him the right to act "on appearances" (to
41. P. 202. By contrast, Ripstein maintains that mistakes of law never provide justifica
tion because they are never reasonable. Were they to provide such justification, the law
could not purport to uphold fair terms of interaction. P. 180.
42. In Ripstein's words, an "attempt meets all the criteria for punishment: The wrong
doer acts to deny the rights of others, and that wrongful act must be denounced." P. 241.
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make reasonable mistakes of fact), so she must be granted the right
to act "within appearances," that is, to act freely until her conduct
unambiguously signals an attempt to commit a crime (p. 237).
Finally, Ripstein asserts that the principle of reciprocity explains
why attempts traditionally have been thought to deserve less severe
punishment than completed crimes.43 From the perspective of reci
procity, an attempt is appropriately described as conduct through
which an actor consciously aspires to place his interests ahead of
others. A completed crime, by contrast, is conduct through which
an actor consciously puts his interests ahead of others so as to cause
a rights violation. Measured on the metric of reciprocity, the latter
is a worse act simply because it has wrought greater damage to the
scheme of rights protected by the law.44
C.

Distributive Justice: Fair Starting Points

In the final two chapters of Equality, Responsibility, and the
Ripstein seeks to connect his analyses of corrective and crimi
nal justice to distributive justice. In one sense, each is a theory of
distributive justice in that it attempts to draw a fair line between
misfortune and wrongful loss (p. 262). Nevertheless, the former are
distinguished by their concern to regulate and respond to private
interactions: to specify when the state may force one citizen to
compensate another for interfering with the other's rights, and
when one may be punished for consciously :flouting the equal distri
bution of rights. Distributive justice, by contrast, concerns the fair
ness of background conditions or "starting points": the degree to
which individuals burdened by illness, disability, poverty, and lack
of access to education, among other things, can address legitimate
claims for assistance to society via government. Its natural home in
the law is thus in the law of taxation and public assistance.

Law,

Ripstein's analysis follows that of the earlier chapters of the
book in that it finds the proper account of distributive justice in the
concepts of reasonableness and reciprocity. Following Rawls, he
43. Pp. 222-25. For subjectivist theories, attempts pose a version of the problem that
arises in connection with the moral luck critique of tort law. The problem is to explain why
attempts are (or seem like they ought to be) punished less severely than completed crimes,
given that they seem to involve identically culpable conduct.
44. P. 225. Ripstein concludes by arguing that his account of criminal conduct explains
why the same conduct that is insufficient to constitute an attempt can be a crime of reckless
ness if certain consequences follow from it. A person who plants a bomb in an office building
at night, and warns police an hour before detonation to evacuate the building, cannot be
convicted of attempted murder if the bomb goes off and no one dies (he can, of course, be
convicted of arson). According to Ripstein, this is because his actions fail to meet the legal
test for attempts: they do not unambiguously manifest an effort to murder. However, if
someone dies when the bomb goes off, the bomber can be convicted of murder because his
act is no longer equivocal: a risk to which he adverted has been realized, even though he did
not intend it to be realized. Thus, the bomber can rightly be held to have committed murder
simply because of his recklessness with regard to the risk of death. Pp. 242-45.
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maintains that the government ensures fair terms of interaction by
ensuring that each possesses an adequate set of primary goods; re
sources that provide one with "the wherewithal to choose his or her
own ends, while protecting each from the excessive burdens that
the choices of others might create" (p. 267). Because it would be
too burdensome on liberty to hold all losses in common,45 the trick
for liberal distributive justice theory is to distinguish between those
deficits for which the affected individual should be held responsible
and those which should be borne by all.

In parallel fashion to his tort and criminal law analysis, Ripstein
develops his own position in response to other theorists who at
tempt to draw this line in moral rather than political terms. Thus,
he reviews Dworkin's argument that an individual ought to be re
sponsible only for deficits that result from choices that she herself
identifies as freely made.46 He also canvases attempts by Arenson,
Cohen, and Roemer to draw the line between misfortune and
wrongful loss by reference to the genealogy of the individual's defi
cit.47 True to form, Ripstein rejects these views because each seeks
to answer a political question in terms of moral ideas of self-control
and blameworthiness (pp. 288-89). His preferred solution, by now
familiar, is to draw the line in terms of the relative burdens placed
on the autonomy of others versus the autonomy of those in need.
Here, the account is quit� sketchy, but it appears to run as follows.
As a matter of fairness, the state must guarantee each person some
measure of wealth, skills, health care, and opportunity, even if it is
the case that the individual lacks such primary goods because of his
own choices. The gambler who fritters away everything (even more
than once) thus has a legitimate claim to some assistance. On the
other hand, fairness does not require that lesser misfortunes that
arise out of individual choices be held in common. The hiker who
suffers injury while on an adventure is not entitled to aid from the
community, at least until she reaches a condition of need (pp. 29394).

45. Chapter 8 develops this claim in response to the radical critique of individual respon
sibility offered by the Soviet jurist Evgeny Pashukanis. Pashukanis challenges the idea that
individuals should ever be left to bear the cost of bad consequences, arguing that all losses
should be borne communally. Ripstein argues that this vision is more hostile to freedom
than the liberal vision it criticizes, in that it would hold each person hostage to the decisions
of others to take risks with their own well-being and the well-being of others. Pp. 246-63.
46. Thus, on Dworkin's view, the cost of health care for the smoker who considers herself
addicted ought to be shared by all; whereas, the costs of care for the person who smokes as a
matter of preference are borne by that person. Pp. 283-84.
47. On these views, a person should be relieved of burdens that result from tastes or
habits that he adopts out of ignorance or merely as a result of following local norms. Pp. 28488.
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COMMENTS AND CRITICISMS

It should go without saying that there is a great deal to discuss in
a book of this range and depth. I will begin by mentioning some of
the broadest theoretical issues it raises. The remainder of my com
ments will concern its account of the relationship between correc
tive justice, on the one hand, and criminal and distributive justice
on the other hand.
A.

Unfinished Business

The feature of Ripstein's theory that most obviously warrants
further development is its as-yet unspecified account of human in
terests. As it now stands, the theory is to a substantial degree for
mal or structural. It tells us that, in order to instantiate the
principle of reciprocity, the law ought to and does strike a balance
between the importance to a human life of being free to act in cer
tain ways and the importance to that life of being free from a vari
ety of threats and injuries. How one might identify these freedoms
and gauge their importance is not specified, nor does Ripstein say
much about which legal and political institutions might be compe
tent to do so.
Consider Ripstein's claim that the decision in Vaughn v.
to opt for the objective fault standard in negligence is
required by the principle of reciprocity. As spelled out, the claim is
somewhat ambiguous. Indeed, it seems to contain a Kantian argu
ment that failing to hold a clumsy defendant such as Menlove to the
objective standard would deny bis agency,49 an estoppel argument
that, by undertaking ordinary activities, Menlove barred himself
from claiming the benefit of bis clumsiness,50 and an equal liberty
argument that the objective standard is necessary to provide each
with the security necessary to pursue bis own objectives.51 Setting
aside the Kantian argument,52 the problem with the estoppel and
equal liberty arguments is not that they are untenable, but inade
quately justified. Both presuppose undefended substantive claims
about the priority of security of person and property over liberty, or
about the amount of liberty to which each is entitled. Specifically,
the estoppel argument requires an account of what people may le-

Menlove48

48. 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837).
49. See p. 85 ("Had the court relieved Menlove of responsibility . . . they would have been
treating Menlove himself as a mere natural thing rather than as an agent.").
50. See p. 86 ("Menlove cannot both claim incapacity in a particular case, yet also insist
on the liberty to engage in risky activities.").
51. See p. 85 ("[H]olding Menlove liable is the only way to treat the parties as equals, by
protecting them each from the activities of others . . . .").
52. Doing so seems warranted in light of Ripstein's tendency to criticize others for relying
on metaphysical arguments.
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gitimately expect of one another, an account that in turn depends on
a substantive ordering of values. Likewise, contrary to Ripstein's
assertion, the objective standard is not the "only way to treat the
parties as equals" (p. 85). A uniformly applied subjective standard
would also treat the parties equally: it would equally demand of
each that she do her best. Thus, to complete the case for the objec
tive standard, some further substantive argument - whether an in
strumental argument concerning deterrence, administrative ease,
etc., or a political or moral argument for the priority of Vaughn's
security over Menlove's liberty - is required.
The task of developing a normative account of human interests
will no doubt prove challenging as a matter of political and moral
philosophy. It may also prove difficult to square with certain well
established features of the law. For example, emotional well-being
is a plausible candidate for being the sort of important human inter
est that law ought to protect, yet the law generally permits us to
take substantial liberties with others' peace of mind. Rawlsian ac
counts such as Ripstein's may have a hard time explaining why this
is or ought to be the case.53
A second issue that Ripstein might wish to address concerns the
mechanism through which fairness enters the law. As indicated
above, his theory deliberately straddles the line between descrip
tion (or interpretation) and prescription. It thus claims not only
that the terms of tort and criminal law are justified by the principle
of reciprocity, but also that the law is already shot through with
doctrines that instantiate that principle. As is the case with the par
allel positive thesis that tort doctrine embodies the principle of effi
ciency,54 it would be interesting to know more about the
institutional mechanisms by which the common law has come to
embrace justice. Does Ripstein follow Holmes in endorsing the
roughly Hegelian notion that judicial decisions tend to reflect the
ideals of their age? Or does the demand of coherence in legal rea
soning tend to isolate over time just results and thus allow the law
to 'work itself pure'? One also wonders if there is reason to believe
that modem judges will do justice, particularly if they continue to
operate within a Realist model that insists that judges ought to
53. Keating, for example, explains that the law's spotty protection of emotional well
being is consistent with Rawlsian fairness because (1) emotional well-being is not an impor
tant interest; and (2) recognition of a general cause of action for emotional distress would
allow the hyper-sensitive plaintiff to set unilaterally the terms of interaction. See Keating,
supra note 23, at 344, 347. Neither of these arguments is very convincing. It is hard to see
why emotional well-being is not a basic human interest. Keating, moreover, fails to explain
why fairness bars recovery for emotional distress yet permits recovery by the physically
hyper-sensitive (thin-skulled) plaintiff.
54. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. PosNER, THE EcoNoMIC STRUC
OF TORT LAW (1987) (articulating the claim that common law tort doctrine is efficient).

TURE

1846

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 97:1828

make decisions on the basis of aggregate considerations of utility or
efficiency.
One final matter for further consideration derives from the awk
wardness that arises when the British tradition of linking rights and
wrongs is exported from a parliamentary to a constitutional regime.
Blackstone accepted as a fact of political life that Parliament pos
sessed the raw power to violate rights and legalize wrongs.ss The
central notion of an American-style constitutional regime, by con
trast, is that rights are judicially protected against legislative en
croachment. But if the law of rights and the law of wrongs express
the same deep principle of political justice, when they are imported
into such a regime, should they not both be constitutionalized?
Ripstein, following the overwhelming tendency of modern
scholars, affords rights and wrongs asymmetrical constitutional
treatment. Indeed, he asserts quite bluntly that the laws of tort and
of crime ought not to have constitutional status (p. 10), and that
there is nothing inherently problematic with the replacement of the
law of civil wrongs by a social insurance scheme. Yet this two
tiered treatment of rights and wrongs requires justification.
Ripstein is careful to explain that he would not endorse the dis
placement of tort law by some alternative scheme unless that
scheme better protects individuals' liberty and security rights (p.
20). But this is only a partial account of the second-class constitu
tional status of tort law. It can explain why schemes such as work
ers' compensation might be justified as a matter of fairness.s6 It
fails to explain why fairness does not bar legislatures from preempt
ing or abolishing tort law outright, a power that they are often pre
sumed to possess.s7 In short, if Ripstein is correct that liberalism
issues in a theory of rights and wrongs, what within liberal-constitu
tional theory explains why legislatures are not permitted to trample
on our rights, yet are free to eliminate the law of wrongs?
B.

Corrective Versus Penal Justice

As we have seen, Ripstein draws a very sharp distinction be
tween tort and crime. To commit a tort is to engage in conduct that
unfairly exposes others to the risk of certain harms, which conduct
results in the realization of that risk. To commit a crime is to en
gage in such conduct consciously. Torts subject tortfeasors to the
55. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 156.
56. This is akin to the argument made by some American constitutional lawyers that the
institution of judicial review should be scrapped, because it is less efficacious in protecting
our basic liberties than some alternative scheme of government. See HENRY STEELE
COMMAGER, MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS 80-81 (1958).
57. For an elaboration of these issues, see John C.P. Goldberg, Redress and Responsibil
ity in Constitutional Law (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file \vith the author).
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sanction of compensatory payments. Crimes subject criminals to
the sanction of punishment. I leave to others the issue of whether
this definition of crime suffices to encompass the full range of crimi
nal offenses. Here I want to focus on problems that arise with re
spect to his treatment of torts, particularly the awkward place of
intentional torts in his theory.
It is worth mentioning that there is something facially odd about
Ripstein's having chosen to draw the line between tort and crime in
terms of the defendant's mental state. In every other context, he,
no less than Holmes, insists that the law must judge conduct only by
"external" standards. Indeed, as we have seen, he regards the ob
jective standard of reasonableness in tort and crime as not merely
permitted, but mandated by justice. Since the determination as to
whether particular conduct may be considered criminal rests not on
a moral inquiry into whether the defendant deserves punishment,
but rather on the question of whether it is fair to punish him, it is
hard to see why reciprocity does not forbid this determination from
being made on the basis of the actor's mental state. Conversely,
reciprocity would seem to entail an objective standard that asks the
judge or jury to assess what the defendant should have known
about the risks that attended his conduct.
Ripstein is a bit elusive on this point, and it might be that he
actually endorses an objective standard of advertence. For exam
ple, in connection with an argument concerning civil disobedience,
he notes, "[w]hatever the criminal is actually thinking, the crime is
treated as driven by the criminal's private perspective" (p. 162). A
similar inference can perhaps be drawn from the suggestion in his
discussion of attempts that individuals have the right to act "within
appearances," and from his endorsement of recklessness as suffi
cient to establish advertence (pp. 233-34, 237).
If these passages do indicate his endorsement of an objective
standard, then his distinction between tort and crime will sit better
with the political nature of his theory. However, it may do so at the
cost of muddying his neat analytic division between corrective and
criminal justice. On the objectivist version of his theory, criminal
liability will attach to conduct whenever it can reasonably be con
strued as manifesting conscious disregard of a risk of harm to
others. Whether, on this account, criminal conduct can be distin
guished from tortious conduct is questionable. Indeed, Ripstein's
view may prove to be indistinct from Holmes's position that tort
and criminal law are not divided but united because both specify the
same minimum condition for sanction, namely, an act taken under
circumstances in which a reasonable person would have adverted to
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the risk of harm, and would have taken reasonable precautions
against causing it.ss
Even if Ripstein can satisfactorily draw the line between tort
and crime at advertence, certain anomalies result from its being
drawn there. Most fundamentally, Ripstein's distinction seems to
render the whole category of intentional torts ad hoc. On the terms
of his theory, to identify conduct as an "intentional tort" is to con
flate the idea of tortious conduct (taking illegitimate risks with the
security of others and causing injury through the realization of
those risks) and criminal conduct (intentionally, knowingly, or reck
lessly exposing others to illegitimate risk). If his rendering of the
tort/crime distinction is correct, it is difficult to understand why the
law ever developed the hybrid category of intentional tort and,
more importantly, the justification for its continued use. One
would think that the law should instead respond to instances of con
scious wrongdoing first by recognizing a civil cause of action purely
for compensation that responds to the defendant's wrongful "tak
ing" of the risk, and second by undertaking a punitive criminal ac
tion that responds specifically to the defendant's having "chosen"
that risk.
One of the manifestations of this difficulty is that Ripstein, like
every corrective justice theorist, has a difficult time accounting for
the well-established tort remedy of punitive damages. Ripstein
concedes that this remedy is genuinely penal: in fact, he uses puni
tive damages to illustrate the true nature of punishment (pp. 14955). But what within the reciprocity principle explains why it is fair
to single out a subset of all criminal acts for private prosecution
under civil standards, not to mention the possibility of double (civil
and criminal) punishment?59
Ripstein must also explain the awkward fact that certain adver
tent wrongdoing is tortious but not criminal. This category in
cludes, for example, conduct that amounts to intentional infliction
58. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 6, at 1754-55 (describing Holmes's position).
59. If Ripstein's theory can account for the existence of punitive damages, it may encoun
ter a different problem, in that it seems to call for their dramatic expansion, at least with
respect to the current state of American law. For Ripstein, the essence of criminality is to
treat individuals' rights merely as costs. This definition suggests that punitive damages (if not
criminal prosecution) should be visited on any actor who employs a risk-utility calculus to
determine how to act, and then causes injury in so acting. U.S. companies might fairly object
that courts and commentators have for some time told them to undertake precisely this sort
of calculation in making design and manufacturing decisions. See Michael D. Green, The
Schizophrenia of Risk-Benefit Analysis in Design Defect Litigation, 48 VAND. L. REv. 609,
624-27 (1995) (noting mixed messages sent by the legal standards for product defects and jury
awards of punitive damages). More generally, it seems strange to punish corporations for
adverting to risks given that a significant source of product-related injuries is probably orga
nizational pressures that cause corporate actors to avoid confronting the risks associated with
their activity. See David Luban, A Flawed Case Against Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 359,
370-74 (1998) (noting the value of punitive damages in correcting corporate "pathologies").
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of emotional distress or intentional interference with contract.
These are harm-causing wrongs that should qualify as criminal acts
by his definition. What is missing, then, is a principled explanation
of their exclusion from the reach of criminal punishment. Does
fairness demand that the list of crimes be expanded to cover all
intentional torts, or that the list of intentional torts be limited to
conduct that has been criminalized? If so, Ripstein's distinction be
tween torts and crimes would seem to take a serious hit at the level
of "fit."
C.

Corrective Justice, Distributive Justice, and the Law of Torts

Ripstein previously developed and applied the ideas of reciproc
ity and risk ownership to corrective justice in a 1995 article co
authored with Jules Coleman.60 In response to that article, Stephen
Perry claimed that the attempt to harmonize corrective and distrib
utive justice through the principle of reciprocity fails because it ulti
mately causes the former to disintegrate into the latter.61 In Perry's
view, the theory's focus on the fair distribution of losses entails a
purely allocative account of tort law because it fails to connect its
account of unfair conduct to a duty on the part of the actor to repair
the losses resulting from that conduct. Thus, the core idea of cor
rective justice - the idea of holding individuals responsible to re
pair certain losses - is abandoned. That an actor has taken an
unacceptable risk may establish that it is unfair to let an innocent
victim of that risk-taking bear the losses that occur when the risk is
realized, but it does not suffice to establish that the actor has in
curred an obligation to indemnify the victim. Indeed, reciprocity
would equally be satisfied under a system that compensated victims
through a general insurance fund and imposed fines or other pun
ishments on wrongdoers. Nor, Perry argued, could Ripstein and
Coleman rely on risk ownership to provide the missing link be
tween wrongful conduct and the duty to repair. That concept, he
claimed, merely reproduces in metaphoric language the very gap he
had identified.62 Ripstein and Coleman did not literally mean that
wrongful risk-takers own those risks in the way they own property.
Rather, they were merely reasserting through figurative language
their unsupported claim that unfair acts generate a duty to repair.
It is not clear whether Perry's critique applies to Equality, Re
sponsibility, and the Law. Even if it does not apply, other problems
emerge. In particular, it seems that Ripstein's theory of corrective
60. See Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief & Misfortune, 41 McGILL L.J. 91
(1995).
61. See Stephen R. Perry, The Distributive Tum: Mischief, Misfortune and Tort Law, 16
QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 315 (1996).
62. See id. at 323-30.
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justice is not true to the tort law from which it claims to be derived.
Indeed, his theory is in one respect "jurispathic"63: in attempting to
explain and justify the central concepts of negligence law by refer
ence to the principle of reciprocity, it tends to drain those concepts
of their meaning.

1. Risk Ownership and Responsibility
The idea of risk ownership is obviously central to Ripstein's the
ory, but the way in which it functions within his theory is still not
altogether clear. If it is meant to serve as a freestanding justifica
tion for why a tortfeasor ought to be held liable for her victim's
losses, or for particular tort doctrines, then Perry's critique is proba
bly justified. Consider, for example, Ripstein's claim that the risk
rule - the rule that negligent defendants should only be held liable
for the realization of those risks that lead us to label the conduct
negligent in the first place - is a "direct consequence of the idea of
risk ownership."64 The claim appears to be that the risk rule is jus
tified simply because tortfeasors own those risks that make their
conduct negligent. Taken as such, it merely asserts in other words
that tortfeasors can fairly be held liable only for those risks that
make their conduct negligent. Such an assertion is not wrong or
incoherent, but it is misleading in that it suggests the idea of owner
ship is doing some work, when it is not.
It may be, however, that Ripstein relies on risk ownership not as
an independent justification for the imposition of a duty of repair,
but as a means of capturing the basic intuition that undergirds cor
rective justice. As he explains, "talk of people owning risks . . . is
simply a way of spelling out the idea expressed in such familiar idi
oms as 'that's not my problem' " (p. 47). On this reading, risk own
ership is Ripstein's device for capturing what he takes to be the
animating idea of corrective justice: the idea that, when a loss has
occurred, we must inquire whether some other person is responsi
ble for that loss and thus obliged to assume it.
To read the argument in this way is, perhaps, to downplay the
importance of risk ownership, for it concedes that the concept does
not provide a freestanding justification for holding wrongdoers re
sponsible to indemnify for the losses that they cause.65 Even apart
63. Although I do not employ it in his sense, the term "jurispathic" is borrowed from
Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HAR.v. L. REv. 4, 42 (1983).
64. P. 67. "Wrongdoers," he explains, "own the wrongful consequences of their deeds,
that is, the consequences the risk of which made those deeds wrongful." P. 68.
65. The strength of this criticism depends in large part on what is held to count as ade
quate justification. Given his antifoundationalism, see supra text accompanying note 20, Rip
stein probably would argue that the idea of risk ownership justifies imposing a duty of repair
on tortfeasors simply because it captures or articulates a sentiment of fairness embodied in

May 1999]

Rights and Wrongs

1851

from this issue, however, a separate question exists as to whether
the law of torts is rightly understood as instantiating corrective jus
tice - whether, to invoke Jules Coleman's choice of words, tort law
really is about cleaning up messes.66 I think not. By describing tort
law as determining when a given loss suffered by A ought to be
shifted to B, Ripstein permits the tail of damages to wag the dog of
liability. The "make whole" measure of damages becomes the cen
terpiece of tort law, and the job of tort theory becomes that of ex
plaining and justifying why and when "ownership" of a given loss
should be shifted.
There are several related difficulties with this approach. First,
as evidenced by instances of harmless trespass and dignitary torts,
tort liability is not necessarily predicated on a reduction in the
plaintiff's utility or welfare. In the language of the Second
Restatement:

Damages fl.ow from an injury . . . . [I]rijury denotes the invasion of any
legally protected interest. 'Injury' is thus distinguished from 'harm,'
which is a nonlegal word implying merely a detriment in fact. The
infliction of harm does not always give rise to a cause of action. . . .
Conversely, there may be a cause of action although there has been
no harm.67
Second, even with regard to the typical case where the tort is
accompanied by loss, it may be that the "make whole" measure is
an unreliable indicator of the basic structure of tort law. The com
partmentalization of damages into compensatory and punitive com
ponents may prove to be a relatively recent development. In 1927,
for example, one finds the Supreme Court opining that the distinc
tion between types of damages is a modern one, and that, histori
cally, the proper measure of · damages was the amount of
compensation a reasonable juror would find fair - regardless of
whether that amount was less than, equal to, or greater than, the
amount that would make the plaintiff whole.68 Even today, apart
our practices of assigning liability. Perry, he would further suggest, asks for too much when
he demands of corrective justice theory that it go beyond making sense of legal practice by
grounding that practice in an independent theory of moral responsibility.
It is also worth pondering whether Perry's criticism is so strong as to undermine any
theory of corrective justice that attempts to justify the tort system by exclusive reliance on a
theory of responsibility, including his own. To travel the full distance from responsibility for
harm to tort law may instead require the merger of an adequate account of responsibility
with an independent theory that explains why the state ought to respond to instances of
responsibility by empowering those harmed to seek redress from those responsible through a
private action at law.
66. See Jules L. Coleman, Second Thoughts and Other First Impressions, in ANALYZING
LAw: NEw EssAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 257, 302 (Brian Bix ed., 1998) ("Tort law is about
messes. A mess has been made, and the only question before the court is, who is to clean it
up? ").
67. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 902 cmt. a (1979).
68. See Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 116 (1927) ("The distinction
between punitive and compensatory damages is a modem refinement.").
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from reimbursement for out-of-pocket losses, the notion of "make
whole" damages is understood as a fiction, not merely because it is
in practice difficult to quantify nonpecuniary damages, but because
a monetary award simply "cannot restore the injured person to his
previous position."69 These bits of evidence suggest that the plain
tiff is entitled as a matter of law not to "make whole" compensation
for these losses, but the amount a reasonable person would regard
as "fair" compensation in light of plaintiff's loss.70
Given that tort does not require loss, and insofar as the general
measure of tort recovery is fair (not full) compensation, the notions
of risk ownership, and of "corrective" justice more generally, lose
some of their plausibility as interpretive accounts of tort law. Tort
judgments are not rightly described as shifting to the defendant
ownership of the consequences of his conduct, nor as requiring him
to "correct," or "undo," or "clean up" those consequences. Instead,
the defendant is made to pay a compensatory award to the plaintiff
that is fair in light of the consequences that flowed from his having
wronged the plaintiff.
To put the point in jurisprudential terms, the idea of risk owner
ship is problematic because it treats rights as a function of remedies,
and hence, defines tortious conduct as wrongfully causing loss
rather than wrongfully invading protected interests.71 As Ben
Zipursky has pointed out in connection with the work of other cor
rective justice theorists:

[T]he principle that those who have right of action against a defend
ant are entitled to have the defendant pay them compensatory dam
ages, with the aim of making them "whole," is converted into a
principle that the very justification for imposing liability on a defend
ant is that the defendant has caused harm to plaintiff, and made her
less than whole.72
The core question of tort law and theory is not the question of
whether a particular pile of disutility currently residing with person
A can be passed along to B. Rather, it is the question of when A
may legitimately complain that B has wrongfully invaded her inter
est in bodily security, property ownership, reputation, etc. To be
sure, A can also complain that, as a consequence of B's invasion,
69. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a (1979).
70. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 cmt. b (1979) (stating that for nonpecu
niary losses, "[t]he discretion of the judge or jury determines the amount of recovery, the
only standard being such an amount as a reasonable person would estimate as fair compensa
tion"); see also John C.P. Goldberg, Misconduct, Misfortune, and Just Compensation:
Weinstein on Torts, 97 CoLUM. L. REv. 2034, 2038-49 (1997) (questioning the soundness of
the "make whole" measure of damages).
71. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 cmt. a (1965) (discussing invasions of
interest).
72. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L.
REv. 1, 81-82 (1998).
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she suffered economic and noneconomic loss, and she will often be
entitled to pass that loss onto B. But her loss, and her ability to
transfer it to B, are consequences of B's having wronged her; they
are not the wrong itself. Although Ripstein himself recognizes this
distinction in other contexts, the metaphor of risk ownership is
problematic precisely because it runs together right and remedy,
and thus mis-describes tortious conduct as the wrongful causing of
loss.

2. Reciprocity and Reduction
Ripstein, as we have seen, claims that the key to tort law resides
in the principle of reciprocity. By specifying that each is free to act
reasonably, tort law sets reciprocity as the standard of conduct. By
specifying that tortfeasors are responsible only to those put at risk
by their acts, and, in the case of intervening acts, only for harms
resulting from the reasonable conduct of others, it sets the scope of
liability in accordance with the reciprocity principle. As with re
gard to the concept of risk ownership, the question I am most con
cerned to pursue is whether Ripstein's conceptual apparatus
succeeds in capturing what courts and lawyers mean by the ideas of
duty, fault, and proximate cause. Once again, I am inclined to think
that it does not.
Consider the core idea of reasonableness. On Ripstein's view,
whenever the law employs a reasonableness test in tort (or crimi
nal) law, it calls for balancing the defendant's interest in freedom of
action (the value of the activity, and the degree to which it is bur
dened) against the plaintiff's interest in the security of his person
and property (the value of that interest, and the degree to which it
is burdened). There are a number of potential problems with this
reconstruction of reasonableness. It may be indeterminate, for ex
ample. Also, it may ask judges and juries to make inappropriate
and acontextual judgments about the relative value of different in
terests and activities. The particular deficiency with which I am
concerned, however, is that it does not actually seem to capture
what courts and lawyers mean when they employ the idea of unrea
sonable or faulty conduct in tort cases.
Certain unintentional wrongs - negligent driving, for example
- are perhaps best described as normatively nonreciprocal in
Ripstein's sense, as illegitimately taking liberty at the expense of
others' security. But many (if not most) others are not. To design a
product negligently is not to exercise a relatively unimportant lib
erty at the expense of others' security; it is to fail to advert to, and
take measures to avoid, certain dangers posed by the product. To
commit malpractice is not to act in a way that overvalues liberty of
action and devalues bodily security; it is to fail to attend properly to
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the duties and standards of one's profession.73 To libel someone
negligently is not to sacrifice the more important interest in reputa
tion for the less important activity of free speech; it is to publish a
defamatory statement about another person without sufficient re
gard for its truthfulness.
It is, of course, open to Ripstein to claim that each of the
preceeding descriptions is superficial - that what is "really" going
on in negligent design, malpractice, and defamation cases is a bal
ancing of liberty and security. The problem with this move, how
ever, is that the notion of "striking a balance" between liberty and
security becomes so abstract as to lose texture or bite. In turn, it
becomes capable of explaining (and thus supporting) almost any
doctrine or holding.74
With regard to other tort law concepts, the problems Ripstein
faces are more severe. As indicated above, he maintains that pretty
much every important principle of negligence law is an instantiation
of the ideas of reciprocity and re'asonableness. Consider, for exam
ple, his argument that the duty requirement follows from the ideas
of reasonableness and reciprocity (pp. 50-51). Under the reciproc
ity principle, the fairness of imposing liability on a defendant turns
on whether he has created illegitimate risk. Following Cardozo,
Ripstein maintains that, so far as tort law is concerned, risk is inher
ently relational; it is the risk of certain harms to certain persons.75
Hence the duty requirement: a plaintiff can sue only if he can show
that his injury was the result of conduct by the defendant that
wrongfully created the risk of that injury to him or persons like him.
This account of relational duty is coherent. It may even be su
perior to the nonrelational account of duty advocated by Holmes,
Prosser, and others.76 Still, it is not entirely faithful to the law of
negligence. The duty requirement is not coextensive with the risk
rule: that the plaintiff's harm resulted from the realization of a risk
that made the defendant's conduct negligent is not sufficient to es
tablish a duty of care. Indeed, individuals whose conduct poses an
illegitimate risk of harm to the important interests of others often
have no legal duty to modify their conduct in light of that risk. In
most jurisdictions, for example, a landowner is generally not
obliged to take reasonable care to prevent accidental injury even to
73. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Malpractice and the Structure ofNegligence Law, 67
FORDHAM L. REv. 649, 675-76 (1998) (arguing that risk-taking does not capture the legal
meaning of malpractice).
74. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 6, at 1740-43 (criticizing malleability of Prosser
ian accounts of duty).
75. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
76. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 6, at 1739-43, 1752-64, 1807-12 (describing and
criticizing on conceptual and pragmatic grounds nomelational conceptions of duty).
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foreseeable trespassers or social guests.77 Likewise, one generally
has no obligation to take care to avoid causing emotional or eco
nomic harm to others: those who suffer such harms have no legal
ground to complain, notwithstanding that the risk rule is satisfied.78
In and of itself, the risk rule does not explain these exemptions: an
independent account of the duty element is required.79
Ripstein's reconstruction of foresight as another manifestation
of the idea of reasonableness also fails to capture the law as it is.
Recall that, in his view, the law pertaining to intervening acts deems
reasonable behavior foreseeable, which in· turn demonstrates that
the concept of foresight itself is simply a manifestation of reasona
bleness. Yet to establish that the law treats reasonable intervening
acts as foreseeable hardly establishes that foreseeability is reasona
bleness. Indeed, as Ripstein himself notes (pp. 126-27), courts fre
quently hold that instances of unreasonable conduct are also
foreseeable, including, for example, medical malpractice committed
on accident victims.so
In raising these various objections, my point is not that reasona
bleness and reciprocity lack explanatory or justificatory power. In
fact, I think Ripstein demonstrates that the idea of reciprocity pro
vides important arguments for the law's use of objective standards
and its willingness to impose liability on barely culpable conduct. It
might also demonstrate, as George Fletcher famously argued, the
soundness of the rule of strict liability with respect to ul
trahazardous activities.81 It might even be the case that one justifi
cation, or the best justification, for the tort system as a whole is that
it gives effect to a liberal theory of reciprocity or equality. But this
is not to say that tort law just is reciprocity - that each of its cen
tral doctrines and concepts reduces down to the idea of balancing
liberty against security. Ripstein, in short, treats one feature and
justification of tort law as the law itself.
The criticism being offered here is in part jurisprudential. My
complaint is that Ripstein's theory, no less than Posner's or Pros
ser's, leaves no room for the law to exist independently of its nor
mative justification or function.82 But it also reflects a complaint
77. See id. at 1775 & n.161 (describing case law).
78. See id. at 1773.74 & n.158.
79. See id. at 1812-46 (outlining a relational conception of duty in negligence).
80. See w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 44, at
309 (5th ed. 1984).
81. See Fletcher, supra note 12, at 546-47.
82. For an illustration of a nonreductionist, yet pragmatic, approach to law, see John C.P.
Goldberg, The Life of the Law, 51 STAN. L. R:Ev. 1419, 1455-74 (1999) (analyzing Cardozo's
jurisprudence as embodying "pragmatic conceptualism"). For a philosophical analysis and
defense of such an approach, see Benjamin C. Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, Civil Re
course, and Corrective Justice, (Mar. 18, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author).
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about liberal political theory itself, or at least certain versions of it.
Ripstein's theory, true to its Kantian roots, aims to set the fair
terms of social interaction for a society of strangers. Thus, it
reduces all instances of wrongdoing to a single generic description
in terms of the abstract values of liberty and security. The effort to
connect liberalism to an account of legal wrongs, in my judgment,
will not succeed on these terms. Rather, liberals must develop and
incorporate into their political theory a richer, yet distinctly liberal,
understanding of civil interaction, one that recognizes that private
interactions are mediated through social roles and meanings, and a
web of expectations and obligations that arise out of them. By do"
ing this, liberals will permit themselves an account of wrongs that
remains tied to rights, yet does not reduce each instance of wrong"
doing to the generic wrong of taking liberties.
CONCLUSION

Equality, Responsibility, and the Law is a sophisticated effort to
merge egalitarian liberalism with the Blackstonian tradition linking
rights and wrongs. In claiming that the law of tort and crime, as
much as the law of constitutional rights, is integral to liberal polit"
ical theory, it marks a pronounced departure from current liberal
orthodoxy, yet also steers clear of the opposing orthodoxy of liber"
tarianism. Moreover, by analyzing the law of tort and crime in
terms of the political principle of reciprocity, it sheds new light on
institutions and concepts that continue to puzzle judges and legal
scholars. Although I have criticized certain aspects of the book,
particularly its treatment of torts, in my judgment Ripstein has pro"
vided us with an original, insightful, and highly valuable piece of
political and legal philosophy.

